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FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS:
A GENERAL SURVEY
REGINALD PARKER*

HISTORY

The most important function of administrative agencies is the making
of regulations' of general applicability. The separation of powers doctrine
has not been able to prevent the rise of quasi-legislation in American law.
An early instance of empowering the executive to act in a quasilegislative capacity is the Act of June 4, 1794,2 which authorized the President
"whenever, in his opinion, the public safety shall so require," to proclaim
or revoke embargoes against foreign vessels.3 This practice was continued
in subsequent statutes and upheld by the Supreme Court. 4 A yet earlier
example of legislative delegation, but not to the executive, can be found
in the original Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,5 whose Section 17 empowered
the courts to promulgate rules of practice. The Supreme Court upheld
this because Congress "may certainly delegate to others powers which the
legislature may rightfully exercise itself."6
Yet it was only after the Field case was decided in favor of the government that administrative agencies were entrusted to an increasing degree
with implementing the lawmaker's task. Yet it was not only the President whose quasi-legislative power the courts sanctioned; 8 it became necessary to authorize the heads of departments to make rules which likewise
*Assistant Editor-in-Chief, NACCA LAw
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1. Or rules, as the APA calls them.

Both words are practically synonymous.

WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1949), entries "Regulation" and "Rule";
SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 254 (1946); FOSTER, SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE CONIMISSION IN THE FEDERAL
DDMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT 215 (Warren

ed. 1947). The word "regulation" is often preferred (c. the "Code of Federal, Regulations") since, in legal usage, "rule" is usuilly confined to procedural norms. Another
term frequently used is "order" (as in "Executive Order of the President"), a word that.
on the other hand, also denotes individual decisions, such as cease and desist "orders."
APA§ 2 TAT. 372
2.1 T
(Cb. 41, 1794).
3. This and similar measures were caused by the wars in Europe, and America's
desire to remain neutral. However, the broad language of the statute did not confine
the President's embargoes to the warring nations.

4. The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch 382 (U.S. 1813).
5. 1 STAT. 73, 83 (1789).
6. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42-43 (U.S. 1825); Bank of the United
States v.Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51, 54-55 (U.S. 1825). Until this date, however, the
courts have not used such a broad language to justify the regulatory power of administrajive agencies.
7. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 549 (1892).
8. E.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, suTra note 7; United States v. Chemical
Foundation, 272 U.S. 1 (1926); 1. W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394 (1928); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936);
Hirabayashi v.United States, 320 U.S. 8 (1943).
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have been upheld by the courts. 9
not subject to the President,' were
regulations, of which we mention
merce Commission."- Finally, to

Later, so-called independent agencies,
created for the specific task of making
only the oldest, the Interstate Comthe independent agencies were added

organizations of a mixed character, whose heads neither are independent
from the President nor have the rank of cabinet members, such as the late
3
12
Office of Price Administration or the present Office of Price Stabilization.'
Thus the United States, like every other country in the world, has left more
and more legislative tasks to specialized administrative agencies.' 4
CLASSIFICATION

Regulations may be classified with reference to their subject-matter,
such as postal, broadcasting, or foreign funds control regulations; or they
may be denominated according to the source from which they flow, such
as executive orders of the President, rules and regulations of the Treasury
Department or of the Federal Communications Commission.
A classification of some consequence is that of procedural as opposed
to substantive regulations. While it is exaggerated to say that agencies have
the "inherent" power to regulate their own procedure," s as a matter of positive law, every administrative agency of the federal government may regulate the conduct of its business including the procedure it intends to
follow. 1 To be able to issue valid substantive regulations, on the other
hand, an agency must be expressly so authorized by the enabling statute: 17
no blanket authority exists here. Furthermore, procedural rules are treated
in the Administrative Procedure Act differently from substantive ones'8
9. E.g., Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904);

United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907)
Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).

Union Bridge Co. v.

(has suney of delegation); United States v.

10. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
11. St. Louis & Iron Mountain Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 287 (1908); Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 471. 486 (1914); Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. ICC,
184 Fed. 118 (5th Cir. 1910), aff'd 227 U.S. 88 (1913); see also CUSHMAN, TnE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGULATORY AGENCIES (1942).

(1941);

FESLER,

TilE INDEPENDENCE

OF STATE

12. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
13. Pursuant to Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 STAT. 798, 50 U.S.C. ApP.
§ 2101 (Supp. 1950).
14. CARE, DELEGATED LpcISLATION (1921), analizes the various reasons for this
development.

And

see WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

(1948);

REP. ATT'Y GEN.

Comm. An. PROC. 97-101 (1941); Laskli, The Growth of Administrative Discretion, I
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 92 (1923); Weeks, Legislative Power versus Delegated Legislative Power, 25 CEO. L.J. 314 (1937); Duff and Whiteside, Delegata protestas non
potest delegari, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 168 (1929).
15. Correctly speaking, any "power" of any person or organization, government or
private, is granted

(1945).

by the legal order.

KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE

But see United States v. Macdaniel, 7 Pet. 1, 13, 14 (U.S. 1833); Haas v.

Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910); United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223 (1914).

16. REv. STAT. 161 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1946), ultimately deriving from 1 STAT.
28 (1789); United States v.George, 228 U.S. 14 (1913).
17. United States v.George, supra note 16; Miller v.United States, 294 U.S. 435
(1935).
18. Section 3(a) (procedural and organizational rules to be stated separately from
substantive ones); Section 4(a) (no advance notice of proposed rule of procedure).
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and their binding effect, particularly upon the agency itself, is at times not
as pronounced as that of substantive rules. 19
Except for matters requiring secrecy in the public interest20 or solely
relating to internal management, 2' Section 3 (a) of the Administrative
Procedure Act requires every federal agency to issue and publish in the
Federal Register a description of its organization (including that of the field
offices, if any, and their location) as well as the procedure by which it
functions. 22 It therefore appears to put an end to the observance of mere
customary rules of procedure.28 The Act, moreover, demands that agency
rules on organization, procedure and substantive law, respectively, must be
stated separately. 24 If it is not always feasible to distinguish between
substantive and adjective law, it is evcn more difficult to separate norms
pertaining to the "organization" of an agency from those dealing with
its "procedure." However, there is nothing in the Act that would suggest
that a failure to observe the rule of separation invalidates the regulation.
Interpretations of statutes by agencies are often called "interpretative
rulings," or just "rulings" or even "rules." Yet they should not be confused
with true regulations. Only the latter, but not the former, are binding law.25
An attempt to delineate regulations against individual decisions meets
difficulties that are enhanced by the fact that regulations often emanate
from the same agency that, in turn, at times also renders individual
decisions.20
Yet some distinction must be drawn, for different rules
of law are applicable to the procedure that leads to either type of administrative act; and they also differ from one another in their respective effect.
No hearing needs to be given to the parties affected by a regulation as a
19. Angelus Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 293 (1945); NLRB v. Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co., 118 F.2d 780, 788-789 (9th Cir. 1941); GELL-ORN, ADMINISTRATIVE

LAw 442-451 (1947).

20. Such as procedure and organization of the FBI, according to Reich, Rule
Making Under the Administrative Procedure Act in THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 496 (Warren cd. 1947); ArT'Y GEN. MAN. AD. PROc. ACT 17 (1947).
21. As, e.g., internal budget data or promotion rules. Ibid.
22. AT'y GEN. MAN. AD. PROC. ACT. 19-22 (1947); see also REP. ATT'Y GEN.
CoMm. AD. PROC. 102-105 (1942). The Federal Register, vol. 11, of September 11, 1946,
consisting of 966 pages, has the material prepared by the agencies pursuant to § 3.
23, See United States v. Macdaniel; lHaas v. Henkel; United States v. Birdsall,
supra note 15. But see United States ex rel. Knauff v. McGrath, 181 F. 2d 839 (2d Cir.
1950), vacated as moot, 340 U.S. 940 (1951) (agency's custom binding on agency).
24. APA § 3(a).
25. The APA contributed nothing to dispel this confusion. Compare § 2(e)
("interpretation" included in "rules") on the one hand with § 4(a) (interpretations
not subject to rule making procedure) on the other. Cf. Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194
F. 2d 329, 331-332 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Davis, Administrative Rules-nterpretative Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 922, 930 (1948); Parker, Administrative
Interpretations, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 533 (1951). A treatise destined to become a classic is
KELSEN, TINE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS xiii-xvii ("On Interpretation") (1950).
Cf.
Parker, Book Review, 45 ILL. L. REV. 822 (1951).
26. Such as the Pure Food, Drug and Cosmetic Administration. 52. STAT. 1040
1938), 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1946). Cf. Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d
76, 686-687, 692-694 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949). And see KELSE N,
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE, 123-136 (1945) (mere gradual difference
between general law and individual norm).
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matter of constitutional (as distinguished from statutory) right,2 T whereas
an individual decision would generally not be binding without prior hearing. Where the Administrative Procedure Act applies, the rule making
procedure is usually different from the adjudicatory procedure. An indivi8
dual order is more easily set aside by a review court than a regulation.2
An example may illustrate our difficulty. The Constitution authorizes
Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Congress applies the Constitution by enacting the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. This, in turn,
authorizes the Federal Security Administrator to establish and promulgate
definitions and standards of identity, as well as standards of fill, for
canned food.2 0 The Administrator applies this statute by directing packers
of canned oysters to can their oysters in such a manner that each can contains at least 59% oysters (rather than water, etc.) and is labelled in a certain specified manner. 30 Is this a regulation or an individual order? However gradual the transition from law of the higher order (constitution,
statute) to law of the lower order (regulation, individual decision) may
be, 1 the practical importance of drawing a line somewhere is obvious in
view of what we have said in the preceding paragraph.
In the example above the court held that a regulation and not an
adjudication was involved, "even though the result of the order (sic) is of
immediate and grave economic import to petitioner."3 2 The court attempts
to draw the distinction from the fact that adjudication is primarily concerned with individual rights and liabilities for past conduct, or present
status, under existing law, whereas the legislative, including the rule making
process, is normally directed at the future and at "situations" rather than
particular persons. The court itself cites legislative divorces as an exception
to this rule, to which could be added many more types of decrees in equity,
bankruptcy or probate procedure, whose effects can be well regarded as
making new law, as indeed any valid decision does; only the case of a
court decree affecting perhaps thousands of parties makes the point more
obvious.
The mode of procedure followed by the agency will often furnish a
strong presumption in favor of either answer. Unquestionably, the best
way to find out whether an administrative act is a rule or individual order
ought to be the language of the administrative action, depending on whether
it is, by its wording, addressed to one or more specifically named individuals,
27. Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, supra note 26. For a more elaborate
treatment of the hearing requirement, see notes 120-125, 155-200 infra.
28. Infra notes 222-30. And see Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S.

358 (1946).
29. 52 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 341, 343(h) (2), 371 (1946);

Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, suPra note 26.
30. 13 FED. REc. 4663 (1948).

31.

KELSEN, GENZRAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE

37-38, 123-162 (1945). And

see Fuchs, Procedurein Administrative Rule Making, 52 HAav. L. REv. 259, 263 (1938).

32. Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, supra note 26, at 686, 692-694.
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or to a group defined in general terms. Yet there are instances where an
agency couches its decree in general, abstract terms-perhaps in order to
avoid the sometimes more stringent conditions under which an individual decision must be issued-although it is in fact addressed only to
one party. Upon review, however, the court will disregard the language
and technique employed by the agency and treat the act as an order rather
than a regulation.33 In other words, border cases must be solved "according
to the merits of each situation," as lawyers are apt to say, meaning that
the answer will depend on whether the preponderant features of the ad34
minstrative act tend to point in the direction of rule or decision.
Rate making often presents a good example of a link between individual decision and general regulation. The weight of authority has always
regarded it as a legislative rather than a judicial act.35 This includes even
the fixing of government payments to common carriers38 though here the
term "rate" is really a "euphemism to embrace a subsidy as well as a
compensation.13 7 Accordingly, Section 2 (c) of the Administrative
Procedure Act decrees that rates fall within the category of rules. However, it adds not only wages, prices and related matters to this conception
but indeed includes "any agency statement of general or particular applicability," mentioning specifically "the approval or prescription for the
future of . . . corporate and financial structures or reorganizations." The
(D.C. Cir. 1947),
And
see Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 175 F.2d 808, 816-20 (D.C. Cir. 1948), vacated on
both parties' motion, 337 U.S. 901 (1949), Note, 34 MINN. L. REV. 464 (1950).
34. E.g., Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 377-388 (1907)
(removal of bridge structure upon "order" of the Secretary of War under the
River and Harbor Act upheld; Court did not discuss whether there was a regulation
or individual decision, but cited authorities are those that have upheld legislative
delegation); United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. 293 U.S. 454, 459, 463-65
(1935) (safety regulations but addressed to individual railroads; Court stating that
the ICC exercised both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions applied the standard
of the latter-findings required-to agency's action); Columbia Broadcasting System
v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 417-21 (1942), Notes, 42 CoL. L. Rtv. 1197 (1942),
10 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 88 (1942), (Court found FCC action to be regulation, but
nevertheless afforded plaintiff standing in court to contest it as if the regulation had
been enforced already, thus treating regulation pro tanto like an individual order);
second PhiladelPhiaCo. case, supra note 33, at 816-819'(court treats SEC order as an
individual decision-hearing constitutionally required-despite APA § 2(e) which
declares corporate reorganization approvals to be regulations); Jordan v. American
Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281, 288-289, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Notes, 97 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 121 (1948), 62 HRv. L. REV. 506 (1949), 33 MINN. L. REv. 771 (1949)
(rate making was held to be legislation, yet a quasi-judicial or, in its absence, a
judicial hearing was considered as constitutionally required).
35. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Garrett,
231 U.S. 298, 305 (1913); Terminal Ry. Ass'n v. United States, 266 U.S. 17,
30 (1924); King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U.S. 100, 102-104 (1928); St. Joseph
Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 50 (1936); Olsen v. Nebraska,
313 U.S. 236 (1941); United States v. Jones, 336 U.S. 641 (1949). But see Chicago,
m. & St. P. R.R. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
36. United States v. Jones, supra note 35; Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.
v. CAB, 336 U.S. 601 (1949).
37. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., supra
note 36, at 608.
33. E.g., Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 164 F.2d 889, 899-901

cert. denied, 333 U.S. 828 (1948), Note, 61 HARV. L. REV. 875 (1948).
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official commentator regards as the main difference between rule making
and adjudication the fact that the former "must be of future effect, implementing or prescribing future law," whereas the latter "is concerned with
the determination of past and present rights and liabilities." We are
informed, furthermore, that the authors of the Act were "aware of this
realistic distinction between rule making and adjudication" and "shaped
the entire Act around it," in that it prescribes "radically different procedures for rule making and adjudication." 3 We can only wish that the
authors would have conveyed their awareness to the readers of the Act.
In the absence of appropriate enlightenment, we must still hold that most
decisions, judicial as well as administrative, are based on past facts and
prescribe future conduct. This is so even in the case of a money judgment,
where the judge, upon events (in the past) as he sees them, directs the
debtor to pay (in the future); but of course here the judgment coexists
with, and superficially may be understood as, a mere "finding" that the
debtor was (and still is) liable to the creditor. A divorce decree, on the
other hand, or one for the partition of property, is entirely addressed
to the future, although naturally the grounds for the decision are in the
past: the decree "creates" a new obligation in the future. And so do most
administrative decisions. Thus, the NLRB or the FTC "finds" that the
respondent did engage in unfair practices and directs him to cease and
desist therefrom in the future. The SEC "finds" that an undesirable
situation, contrary to law, exists in a given corporation and directs the
latter to act in a specified manner. But this last-mentioned administrative
action, however singular and individually limited its effect may be, is supposed to be a regulation under the mandate of Section 2 (c) of the
Act. It is only by an act of faith that this kind of a distinction between
rule making and adjudication can be termed "realistic" rather than blurred.
By way of summary we may state that in order to ascertain whether
the rule making or the adjudicatory procedure should be followed by an
agency in a given instance, the enabling statute and, where applicable,
Section 2 (c) of the Act must be consulted. If the intention of the
statute is uncertain and the subject-mattcr not one involving wages, prices,
rates, financial structures, etc., the distinction will depend on whether the
administrative action is expected to be one of a relatively wide and general
application, or limited to a relatively. small number of addressees. 3 And if
the matter involves individual financial structures, rates, prices, etc., the
act will be a regulation-according to Section 2 (c)-more in name than
38. Arr'Y Gzw. MAN. AD. PRoc. AcT. 12-15 (1947). But see Philadelphia Co. v.
SEC, supra note 33, at 816, which pays no attention to the bemuddled legislative definitions.
39. See Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, supranote 31, at
259, 263.
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in substance. Specifically, the party to such a "regulation" must be given
a due process hearing as in the case of any other individual determination. 40
CONSTITUTIONALITY

In order to be valid, a regulation must neither itself violate the Constitution nor be based on a statute that violates the Constitution.
The former deficiency is not frequent. In most cases where regulations
were found unconstitutional, it was the enabling statute that was held to
violate some provisions of our basic law. Yet there are instances where
administrative regulations were held to be contrary to the Constitution,
as where a state prison regulation purported to abridge or impair the
prisoners' right to apply to the federal-courts for a writ of habeas corpus, 41
or where a presidential regulation was alleged to have invalidated a claim
for services rendered prior to the regulation. 2
In most instances, however, regulations were found to be invalid
either because they exceeded the statutory mandate, which will be discussed
below, or because the underlying statute was unconstitutional. 43
A statute, whether or not it contains rule making authority, may be
unconstitutional for a variety of reasons that have nothing to do with
administrative law, but rather fall within the scope of constitutional law. 44
Of peculiar interest to administrative lawyers, however, is the actual or
imaginary situation where a statute, in authorizing rule making, contravenes the maxim-or what is still left of it-that the legislature may not
delegate its law making authority. As the storm over the old rule has
largely subsided, there is little left for discussion.4 5 With the exception
of the New Deal cases, 48 no federal regulation has been set aside for
many years'as violative of the non-delegation rule; and it is not likely that
the experience of the New Deal cases will repeat itself. The comparative
absence, however, of modem decisions adverse to quasi-legislation does not
mean that there is "no law" whatever on this point. It only means that
Congress is exercising sufficient self-restraint to remain within the wide
40. Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, supra note 33 (second case).

41. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941).
42. See United States v. Davis, 132 U.S. 334, 336 (1889).
43. At times a statute, yet not the resulting regulation, may be unconstitutional
in that the latter does not make use of the unconstitutional authorization. See the
concurring opinion in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, supra note 7, at 697. The
courts follow the principle that a law should be set aside only where this is necessary
for the determination of the case before the court and leave the statute untouched
as long as it is not unconstitutionally administered. United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (dissenting opinion
of Justice Brandeis).
44. See the (incomplete) list in PROVISIONS OF FEDERRAL LAw HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ]BY THE SUPREME COURT

(Library of Congress 1936).

45. Except from a historic point of view, for which see Parker, Separation of
Powers Revisited: Its Meaning to Administrative Law, 49 MIcn. L. REv. 1009 (1951).
46. So-called, because they nearly killed the New Deal. Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
See Stem, The
Commerce Clause and the National Economy 1933-46, 59 HARv. L. Riv. 645 (1946).
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boundaries of the Constitution as now drawn by the courts. What, then,
are those boundaries?
First of all, there must be an express statutory authorization for an
agency to promulgate regulations. Under some foreign constitutions, the
heads of the executive departments may act regardless of, and to an extent
even contrary to, parliamentary authorization. 47 This is not the law in the
48
United States.
Secondly, the statute authorizing the regulation must limit the agency's
authority to a certain, specified, circumscribed task. Obviously, a law
empowering the Attorney General "to make a criminal code" would
impose some limitation-he could not, under such a law, promulgate a
labor relations code-but this would not be sufficiently narrow. 4 On the
other hand, it is today no longer necessary for the statute to be so complete
and specific that the agency may merely proclaim the commencement or
end of the statute's legal force.50 Between these two extremes there lies
what is now considered permissible legislative delegation.5 1
We have selected at random and without claim to completeness of a
few instances of delegation where both the statutory standards and the
limitations upon the agency's power have satisfied the courts as sufficient.
CIRCUMSTANCES

AGENCY'S

UNDER

WHICH

QUAsi-LEGISLATIVE

POWER WAS TO BECOMEEFFECTIVE

If England and France continued
to violate America's neutral cornmerce;

AGENCY'S AuTHORrrY
52

To revive ant embargo act of Congress. (President)

3

47. For instance, under the notorious Art. 48 of the "Weimar" Constitution of
the late German Reich.
48. See 1 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER 224 (8th ed. 1927).
49. Cf. 6 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 10 (1853) (226-page code for Navy issued by
President as Commander-in-Chief held invalid as exercising legislative power).
50. This was the criterion applied in The Brig Aurora, supra note 4; Marshall
Field & Co. v. Clark, supra note 7; and still to a degree in J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co.
v. United States, supra note 7. But see Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785
(1948); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, supra note 26; CARRow, THE BACKGROUND
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

130-2 (1948).

51. Older authorities, such as the Field and Hampton cases ibid. denied the
existence of "delegation," but nowadays this or similar terms are freely used. E.g., Opp
Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 142-143 (1941); Willapoint
Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, supa note 26, at 686-7, 693; CARROW, SupJra note 50, at 118-130
(1948); Note, 130 A.L.R. 272, 273 (1941). If Congress confines itself to laying
down an intelligible principle, this "is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."
Lichter v. United States, supra note 50.
52. Italics supplied in order to indicate relative vagueness.
53. The Brig Aurora, supra note 4.
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If a prohibition to sell arms to the
belligerents in the Chaco conflict
may contribute to the restoration
of peace;54

To prohibit the export of arms to
the belligerent countries. (President)

If it is in the interest of national
defense;55

To prohibit the export of war supplies. (President)

If the United States is in danger of
invasion from foreign nations or
Indian tribes;56

To call forth the militia. (President)

If necessary for the country's pro-

To expel American citizens of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast,
to impose curfews upon' them, etc.
(President, military commanders)

tection against sabotage and espionage;6 7

If foreign countries impose "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable"
custom duties on certain American goods; 8

To suspend statute permitting free
import of certain goods. (President)

If the statutory custom duties do

To increase or decrease, up or down
to 50 per cent, the statutory custom duties. (President)

not equalize our production costs

with those of foreign countries;5 9
If necessary for the protection and
improvement of national forests
and to secure favorable conditions
of water flow;00
If an undue discrimination in rail-

road rates is found to

exist;6 1

To issue regulations concerning the
occupancy and use of national forests. (President, Secretary of Agriculture)
To promulgate reasonable rates.
(ICC)

54. United States v. Curtiss-Vright Export Corp., supra note 8.
55. United States v. Rosenberg, 150 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 752 (1945).
56. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 10 (U.S. 1827).
57. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944). But see Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Rostow,
Our Worst Wartime Mistake, 191 IJHARPER's MAGAZINE, Sept. 1945, p. 193.
58. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, supra note 7.
59. J.W. Hampton, Jr.& Co. v. United States, supra note 7.
60. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 81 (1911).
61. Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914), Note, 14 COL. L. REv. 583
(1914); Wisconsin Rate Cases, 257 U.S. 563 (1922), Comment, 31 YALE L.J.
870 (1922).
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If minimum wages are economically feasible without substantially
curtailing employment; 2

To issue regulations providing for
minimum wages. (Wage and Hour
Administrator)

If necessary to stabilize prices, prevent speculative, unwarranted and
abnormal increases in prices, rents,
wages; to eliminate hoarding, etc.;
to protect consumers, wage earners,
65
investors, etc.;

To promulgate "fair" (or equitable)
prices (so far as practicable at the
level of 1942), rent, wages. (Price
Administrator, National War Labor Board)

The comparative uncertainty of many of these standards is further
enhanced by the fact that the executive charged with carrying out the
provisions by making the regulations is most nearly the ultimate judge as
to whether the facts that give rise to the regulatory power do actually
exist. In many instances this is so stated in the enabling statute itself. 6'
And even where the law does not say so either expressly or by strong implication, the situation is nevertheless the same. 65 The courts as a rule will
not substitute their own judgment for that of the agency as to whether
the facts upon which the agency is authorized to regulate do exist. 6
The enabling statute may constitutionally empower the agency to
accomplish the statutory ends by any means the statute itself may have
validly enacted. Thus the statute may authorize a regulation that declares
contraventions of the regulation to be crimes. This was alleged to be
unconstitutional by the defendants in the Grimaud case,6 7 where the
statute authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to issue regulations concerning sheep grazing in the national forests, and violations of the regulation
were declared to be crimes. The court, upholding the statute, emphasized
that this must not be confused with a situation where an agency without
62. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, supra note 51.
63. Yakus v. U.S., supra note 12; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944);
O'Neal v. U.S., 140 F.2d 908 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 729 (1944); National
Var Labor Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 144 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied,
323 U.S. 774 (1944).
64. "Whenever

the President . . . shall find" would be the most outspoken

expression of this policy, as used, e.g., in J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,
supra note 7. Other statutes, such as the Emergency Price Control Act underlying the
Yakus case, supra note 12, while not using this language, make it clear enough that
the finding rests with the agency.
65. See Martin v. Mott, supra note 56, at 12, declaring the President to be "the
sole and exclusive judge whether the exigency has arisen" that justifies the calling
of the militia.
66. For a discussion see Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, supra note 26. This
case also demonstrates that agencies do not enjoy the same degree of freedom in
choosing remedies. See notes 226.7, infra.
67. United States v. Grimaud, supra.note 60.
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specific statutory authorization declares violations of its regulations to be
crimes.0 1
Nor can it be doubted that, to the extent to which statutes may be
retroactive,60 they may also authorize regulations to take effect prior to
their promulgation. 0 However, this does not happen frequently."
LEGALITY

Unlike mere interpretations, 72 the issuance of regulations must be
statutorily authorized. 78 As to procedural rules, a general permission has
been given to federal agencies long ago; 74 and it is now mandatory for those
coming under the Administrative Procedure Act to issue and publish their
rules of procedure."M No such over-all authorization, however, exists in
regard to substantive lawmaking. In other words, the requirement that the
delegating law be specific and relatively detailed is pressed much more
strongly as to substantive than as to adjective law. The authority that may be conferred by a statute is "to make regulations to carry out the purpose of the act-not to amend it.' 6c But of course
here as elsewhere the borderline between "carrying out" the purpose of a
statute and "amending" it is fluctuating. A very strict view was taken
not so long ago, when a World War I risk insurance law provided, in regard
to compensation eases, that loss of one band and the sight of one eye are
to be regarded as total permanent disability, but had no such provision
as to insurance cases. A regulation extended the legal definition of "total
permanent disability" to insurance cases, and was held invalid as in excess
of the statutory authority." Similarly rigid was an opinion dealing with a
68. As was attempted in United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 (1892). But see
Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 620 (1946), where the "inartistically

drawn" statute was construed by the Court so as to allow the agency the making of
criminal regulations. For further discussion, see notes 87-96, infra.
69. Cf. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938); United States v. Hudson, 299
U.S. 498 (1937); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. United States, 219 U.S. 467 (1911);
Howell Electric Motors Co. v. United States, 172 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1949).
70. Speert v. Morgenthau, 116 F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir. 1940). See also Addison
v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, (1944). For a lucid discussion see
Note, Retroactive Operation of Administrative Regulations, 60 HARV. L. RFv. 627
(1947); Davis, o. cit. stipra note 25, at 944.
71. In the Holly Hill case, supra note 70, the wage regulation before the Court
exceeded the statutory authority. The Court directed the Administrator to draw
another one in conformity with the statute, which was to go into effect as of the
day of the original (invalid) regulation.
72. United States v. Macdaniel, supra note 15; 28 Ors. ATT'Y CEN. 549 (1911).
And see the "policy statement" of the NLRB concerning Board jurisdiction which was
issued as a kind of interpretation without benefit of statutory authorization. NLRB
Press Release, r-342 (Oct. 6, 1950).
73. United States v. Eaton, supra note 68; United States v. Crimaud, supra
note 60.
74. REV. STAT. 161 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (Supp. 1951), deriving from I STAr. 28
(1789).
75. APA § 3(a); ArT'y GEN. MAN. AD. Paoc. ACT. 17-22 (1947). This includes*
agencies not otherwise falling under the Act. APA § 2(a).
76. Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435 (1935); M.E. Blatt Co. v. United
States, 305 U.S. 267 (1938); Roberts v. Commissioners, 176 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1949).
77. Miller v. United States, supra note 76.
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statute which permitted the free importation of animals for breeding
purposes. The customs regulation, however, tried to carry out its task by
prescribing that the animals must be of superior stock and adapted for
breeding purposes, which was held to be in excess of authority."8 A further
example is Mr. justice Holmes' opinion, which denied the so-called Tea
Board's right to reject, pursuant to its regulations, tea as unfit for importation because of its contents of Prussian blue where the enabling statute
did not expressly so allow.79
These decisions may be contrasted, however, with those that have
allowed a wide latitude of discretion and have permitted agencies to do
more than "fill in the details" 0 of a statute. Thus the Treasury Department was held to be authorized to define the statutory term "association"
as including trusts.8 ' During World War II, the president was authorized
to "allocate" certain materials, including fuel oil. He redelegated his
authority to the Price Administrator, who in turn by regulation decreed that
violators of the pertinent rationing order "may by administrative suspension
order, be prohibited from receiving . . . any fuel oil . . . ." This was
upheld by the Supreme Court, rejecting the argument that the authority to
allocate does not include the power to issue suspension orders.8 2
Yet at times even modern courts feel called upon to exercise their
judgment in determining the limits of the law that are drawn around an
agency's disbretion. Thus, Section 13(a)(10) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 19383 exempted certain workers engaged in canning of agricultural
products and employed "within the area of production (as defined by the
administrator)." The Wage and Hour Administrator defined "area of
production" to include employees of canneries that obtain their raw material exclusively from local farms, if "the number of employees .. . does
not exceed seven." Held, not covered by the term "area of production" and
thus in excess of statutory authority.8 4 A Treasury regulation provided that
litigation expenses, unless income producing, be non-deductible from trust
income. The Supreme Court, upholding the Tax Court and reversing the
78. Morrill v. Jones, 106 U.S. 466 (1882). See also Campbell v.Caleno Chemical
Co., 281 U.S. 599, 609-610 (1930).
79. Waite v, Macy, 246 U.S. 606 (1918).
80. This expression, so frequently repeated, was used by Chief justice Marshall
in Wayman v. Southard, supra note 6, at 43.
81. Morissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 349, 354 (1935).
82. Steuart & Bro., Inc. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398 (1944).
And see Field,
Rationing Suspension Orders: A Reply to Dean Pound, 39 A.BA. I . 385 (1944).
See
also Atchison, T, & S.F. Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471 (1937); Scaife Co. v. Commission, 314 U.S. 459 (1941); Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co.,
318 U.S. 218 (1943); Johnston v. Board of Dental Examiners, 134 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.
1943), cert, denied, 319 U.S. 758 (1943).
83. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1946).
84. Addison v.Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., supra note 70.
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Court of Appeals, found that the regulation 5 was in conflict with Section
23(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code and hence "unauthorized." '
The requirement of legality applies, of course, not only to the subjectmatter regulated, but also to the sanction chosen. Here, however, it can
be stated that quite generally a rather wide discretion has been allowed
agencies in determining the means of enforcement. Short of outright
criminal sanctions, almost every mode of repression was found to be covered
by the statute and sufficiently "reasonable" to fall within the permissible
limits of administrative discretion.87 Perhaps the most revealing example
is the Steuart case. 88 As we have seen, the statute merely directed the
OPA to "allocate" goods of any kind "in such manner, upon such conditions and to such extent as he shall deem necessary or appropriate in the
public interest and to promote the national defense;" but the OPA decreed
that violators of the rationing regulations may "by administrative suspension
order, be prohibited from receiving" fuel oil. This was upheld, despite the
company's argument that since the statute did establish specific sanctions,
such as fine, imprisonment, and injunction, it could not validly be subjected
to penalties not mentioned in the act.89 And the National Labor Relations
Board-a tribunal rather than a regulatory agency, but with power to issue
procedural rules 9 0-was held to be authorized to implement its power to
issue a complaint by subpoenaing books and records in advance of issuing a
formal complaint.9' "The relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a
matter for administrative competence, and the courts may enter this area
only if administrative discretion has been exceeded." 1, 2
85. It could be argued, however, that the "regulation" involved, viz., U.S. Treas. Reg.
103 § 19.23 (a)-15, was a mere interpretation. Cf. Dwan, The Federal Administrative
Procedure Act and the Bureau of Internal Revenue in TiE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 142-169 (Warren ed. 1947).
86. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 376-377 (1945).
The
opinion could have rested upon Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943), where
the Court strongly emphasized the "finality" of decisions on "mixed questions" (often
a euphemism for "questions of law") rendered by administrative tribunals such as the
Tax Court. Cf. Paul, Dobson v. Commissioners: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact,
57 HAv. L. REV. 753 (1944). However, the Bingham opinion not only did not
rest on the Dobson case, hnt by way of dictum considerably diminished its force in
that it emphasized that "questions of law" like the one at bar are for the courts
to decide.
87. Cf. SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 274 (1946); ATT' GEN. MAN.
An. PRoc. ACT 88-9 (1947); GELLIZORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 167-70, 322-52 (1947).
88. Supra note 82.
89. Steunart Bro., Inc. v. Bowles, suftra note 82. See Field, op. cit. supra note 82;
Rosden, The Legality of Suspension Orders Issued by the Federal Emergency Agencies, 33
GEo. L.J. 45 (1944).
90. Section 6 of the (old and new) NLRA, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1946).
91. NLRB v.Barrett Co., 120 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1941); Note, 55 HARV. L. REV.
134 (1941). And see Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.)
Cert. denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940), Note, 8 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 129 (1940);
Comments, 29 GEo. L.J. 328 (1940), 26 WAn. U.L.Q. 270 (1940).
92. NLRB v. Cullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361-364 (1951); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941); In re Electric Power & Light Corp., 176 F.2d 687,
692 (2d Cir. 1949).
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There is, however, one traditional exception to the agencies' freedom
of choosing sanctions. The courts have held that to establish an act as a3
crime is a legislative prerogative not to be exercised by way of regulation.
Yet the exception is not so rigid as it sounds. Firstly, it is held sufficient if
the act makes violations of the regulation (not yet promulgated) a crime,
rather than defining the crime itself? 4 This, of course, makes the agency
in fact the co-partner in the legislative process of defining crimes. Secondly,
the requirement that the crime be "established" by law is at times taken
with a grain of salt. For instance, Section 205(b) of the late Emergency
Price Control Act made willful violations of Section 4 a criminal
offense. A corporation was indicted under Section 205(b) although it
had violated not Section 4, but merely regulations issued pursuant to
Section 4. This was upheld, although the Court conceded that Section
205(b) was "somewhat inartistically drawn" in that it did not "specifically
impose criminal liability on those who violate the regulations and orders
of the Administrator;" the Court, however, was satisfied that Section 205(b)
referred to Section 4, which in turn made it "unlawful" to sell in
violation of any regulation.DS Thirdly, the borderline between "penalties,"
which the agencies may impose without limiting, specific authorization,
and "punishments," which are the consequence of "crimes" and may not
be visited upon malefactors without specific statutory authority, may be
of great importance to a lawyer, but certainly not to his client. I for one
entertain the heretic view that, if an agency without express authority may
deprive a business concern of its right to buy supplies,9 because the
agency deems this to be the most efficacious way of treating offenders of
its riles, then the fact that the same agency may not cause the concern
to be fined five dollars without express statutory authority amounts to very
little-certainly not to a safeguard of actual (or imagined) liberties!
Another instance of strict interpretation of the agencies' regulatory
authority in regard to enforcement is the proscription of retroactive regulations. Vhile not invalid if specifically so authorized,91 the authorization is
not to be presumed, but must be express? 8 However, the retroactive effect
93. Pakas v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 472-73 (1918); United States v. Eaton,
144 U.S. 677 (1892). It has long been thought that under a constitutional government
(the German Rechtsstaat) a crime must be "a violation of a public law forbidding
it," as 4 BL. COMM. *5 demands, who, however, overlooks that in England most crimes
were judge-made rather than statutory; but of course, to Blackstone judges did not make,
but merely "found" the (natural) law. See also ferome Hall, Nubll poena sine lege, 47
YALE L.J. 165 (1937); Note, 28 N.C. REv. 84 (1949).
94. United States v. Grimaud, supra note 60.

Cf. CUSHMArN, THE INDEPENDENT

REGULATORY COMMISSIONs 427-437 (1941).

95.
96.
97.
98.

M. Kraus & Bros., Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 619 (1946).
See Steuart Bro., Inc v. Bowles, suPra note 82.
Supra notes 69-71.
Transcontinental Western Air, Inc. v. CAB, supra note 36 at 604, 607.
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of a regulation replacing an invalid one as of the date of the latter was
upheld by the Supreme Court. 0
The general rule-subject to the above-named exceptions-of wide
latitude of agency discretion in selecting means of enforcement includes
the establishment of procedural rules, inasmuch as any "reasonable" rule of
procedure is likely to be upheld. 100 Older decisions, however, at times have
found certain phases of agency procedure to be ultra vires, as where the
ICC issued a regulation whereby it would not recognize assignments of
reparation awards to a stranger to the transportation record. The Supreme
Court treated this to be in excess of statutory authority and hence not
binding on the ICC.101

Some authorities insist that regulations, in addition to being both
constitutional and legal, must be "reasonable." To be sure, the demand
that laws be "just," "adequate" or "reasonable" is probably the oldest
ethical postulate that lawmakers have been confronted with since times
immemorial. 10 2 Under positive law, 1 3 however, "reasonable" must necessarily mean "reasonable as understood by the person deciding upon it."
The proposition that a regulation must not only "be consistent with the
statute but it must be reasonable" was squarely reiterated by the Supreme
Court in Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commnissioner.'0 4 This

opinion, however, merely denies the alleged retroactivity of a certain regulation and reaches the conclusion that the regulation, therefore, was
reasonable. 05 The precedent quoted by the Court 0 6 sheds but little light
on the question as to just what the Supreme Court had in mind when it
required regulations to be reasonable. It was held there that it was
"clearly unreasonable" to impose on the owner of an international bridge
the obligation of furnishing an indemnity bond to cover the losses that
may accrue from the acts of, not the owner, but rather the passengers
crossing the bridge. However, the "regulation" pursuant to which the
99. Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 135
(1936); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., supra note 70; Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1940); Note, 60 HARv. L. REv. 627, 631 (1947).
100. REv. STAT. 161 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1946); SEn. Doc. No. 249, 79th
Cong. 2d Sess. 198 (1946). And Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219, 223-24
(1944); NLRB v. Barrett Co., 120 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1941).
101. Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 253 U.S. 117, 135-37 (1920).
The
ICC in this case disregarded its own regulation by de facto recognition of the assignment,
an attitude which the Court approved, because as an administrative regulation "it, of

course, constituted no limitation" on the ICC. The soundness of this reasoning must
be doubted. See also notes 243-45, infra.

102. CAIRNS, LEGAL PIILOSOPIY FROM PLATO TO I'EGEL 17, passim (1949).
103. For a survey of the subject in regard to the law of the Roman Catholic
Church see Roelker, The Meaning of the Term "Rationabilis" in the Code of Canon

Law, 9 Tim

JURIST 154 (1949).
104. 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936); International Ry. v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506,
514 (1922); United States v. Obenneier, 186 F.2d 243, 247-8 (2d Cir. 1950).
105. The regulation went into effect on the date it replaced an older illegal one.
It might as well be termed retroactive. Cf. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc.
supra note 70, at 620 (1944).

106. International Ry. v. Davidson, supra note 104.
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defendant customs collector acted was in fact an internal instruction and
hence merely an interpretation of the statute not binding on the courts.
Quite consistently, the Court admits that what the Treasury wanted to
accomplish could have been done by express authorization of Congress. 07
In other words, the instruction was merely not a tenable construction of
existing law. There are indeed numerous examples of this vague type
where the courts assert that a regulation must be reasonable; actually, however, they either simply hold this to be the case without more elaboration or
they term the regulation "unreasonable" because it is contrary to the statutory
intention. Thus, in -a recent case 18 the immigration authorities barred
from entering this country a foreign war bride, duly investigated before
marriage. The appellate court refused to invalidate the regulation that
permitted this rather serious instance of tossing human beings abeut as
neither inconsistent with the underlying statute nor "unreasonable or
inappropriate,"'") and the Supreme Court, affirming, found the regulation
to be "reasonable in the circumstances."" 0 But the Court has not informed
us what, then, would be sufficiently unreasonable-yet not contrary to the
statute-to warrant a different opinion. In other cases the courts have
approved in express words as reasonable, or disapproved as unreasonable,
procedural regulations"' and forms. 12 Yet, in the final analysis, the
requirement amounts to no more than that the regulation must not exceed
the statutory authority as conferred by the lawmaker or violate the Constitution. A regulation is "unreasonable" if it is ultra vires of the enabling
statute, even as an unconstitutional act of Congress may perchance be
113
termed as unreasonable interpretation of the Constitution.
Fortunately, the requirement of reasonableness is usually spelled out in
the enabling statutes, which deprives the requirement of its character
praeter legemn. 4 The Administrative Procedure Act has no over-all mandate
of reasonableness for regulations except for Section 10(d), which proscribes
administrative acts that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.""' 5
107. Id. at 514.
108. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Watkins, 173 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1949), aff'd
sub nom,, United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
109. United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Watkins, supra note 108, at 603.
110. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, supra note 108, at 544.
111. E.g., Shoong Investment Co. v. Anglin, 45 F. Supp. 711, 713 (N.D. Cal.
1942) (approving internal revenue procedural rules); Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry., supra note 101 (disapproving ICC procedural rules); United States v. Obernneier,
supra note 104 (approving naturalization rules). And see NLRB v. Barrett Co., supra
note 91; Note, 55 HARV. L. REV. 134 (1941).
112. Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co., supra note 100.
113. Cf. United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 575-77 (1931).
114. E.g., 52 STAT. 1046 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 341 (1946); Willapoint Oysters, Inc.
v. Ewing, supra note 26, at 697; INT. REV. CODE 23(1)(m); Rockford Life Ins. Co.
v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 382 (1934).
115. The words "otherwise not in accordance with law" indicate that acts that are

capricious, etc., constitute mere examples of acts not in accordance with law; rather
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And where the law demands reasonableness, who is to decide whether
a regulation is reasonable or not-the agency or the courts? This problem
is in fact a part of the broader question: What administrative acts-and
regulations in particular-are subject to judicial control? For the purpose of
this study we may merely state by way of summary that the extreme advocates of judicial supremacy would invariably let the courts decide upon
the reasonableness of a rule as on any other legal question;"16 and that, on
the other hand, at least the federal courts have in recent years shown a
tendency toward self-restraint by identifying the question of reasonableness
as a "purely administrative" one into which the courts will not delve.'lr
However, despite such pronouncements the federal courts do not infrequently-thoughi not as often as in previous years-indulge in deciding
themselves the question whether an administrative regulation is or is not
reasonable. 1 8 State courts are even more apt to adhere to this older trend. 19
PROCEDURE

Before discussing the many types of procedure that lead to the making
of rules we must briefly enter upon a problem that is still occasionally being
tossed about. To what extent, if any, does the Constitution require a "fair
hearing," or any hearing at that, to precede the issuance of a regulation?
To a naive reader of many a court opinion it might still appear that
'SEN.Doc. No. 248,
79th Cong. 2d Sess. 40, 278, 310 (1946).
116. Commenting on the rise in importance of the judiciary at the time of and
after John Locke, BERTRAND RUSSELL, A [-IsroRY oF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 639 (1945),
remarks that this "has merely substituted the judge's prejudice for the king's." See
also Parker, Separation of Powers Revisited, 49 Micri. L. REv. 1009 (1951). LASKI,
THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 110-16 (1948), is critical of our way of making the
Supreme Court "in fact a third chamber in the United States" and the resulting
"impossibility of reconciling the judicial function with the power to solve the problems
of modern government." And see Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50
HARv. L. REv. 4, 23 (1936): "There is neither scope nor historical support for the
expansion of the constitutional exaction of reasonableness of official action implied in
uses of the phrases 'liberty,' 'property,' 'due process,' 'unreasonable,' and the like,
into a body of detailed rules attaching definite consequences to definite states of fact."
117. E.g., United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 437 (1949); Ambassador, Inc.
v. United Stateg, 325 U.S. 317, 321 (1945); Rochester Telephone Corp v. United
States, 307 U.S. 125, 139 (1939); Armour & Co. v. Alton R.R., 312 U.S. 195 (1941);
Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557, 562 (1919); Brandeis, J.,
concurring in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 76 (1936).
And see Illinois Steel Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 320 U.S. 508, 510 (1944); United
States ex rel. Knafiff v. Shaughuessy, supra note 108.
118. See notes 104-12 supra.
119. A reductio ad absurdum of the tale that judges know better than administrative
officers what is reasonable furnishes Lakewood Express Service, Inc. v. Board of Public
Utility Commissioners, 137 N.J.L. 440, 60 A.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. 1948), rev'd, 1 N.J. 47, 61
A.2d 730 (1948). The Public Utilities Commission, acting pursuant to statute, found sevenpassenger sedans not to be reasonably safe for bus transportation. The state supreme
court, on July 23, held unanimously that the Commission's ruling was "entirely reasonable
and appropriate." But a brand new supreme court, on November 1, in a 4-1 decision
held the rule of the Commission to be unreasonable and "counter to common experience
of mankind," without being disturbed in its self-assurance by the fact that a number of
persons, including supreme court judges and experienced commissioners, had found the
rule to be reasonablet

than vices aside from unlawfulness as the naturalists would have it.
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some "hearing," or even a quasi-judicial procedure, must precede the issuance of any regulation as a matter of due process.120 A closer scrutiny dispels
the doubt, however. "In legislation, or rule-making, there is no constitutional right to any hearing whatsoever."''2 Whenever hearings informal or
formal, or even regular adversary proceedings, are held preparatory to rulemaking, this is purely a matter of statutory law. Even as the legislature itself
is not bound to hear parties affected by intended legislation, the lawmaker
need not require such of those organs that make laws in his name. 12 2 This
of course does not mean that it is at times not desirable to hold hearings or
even base regulations on a formal, quasi-judicial record.' 2 3 Apart from procedural regulations, where the sole procedure required is their publication in
the Federal Register, 12 4 it is today the rule rather than the exception that
agencies follow at least a consultative or auditive procedure, if not an
25
adversary one.
The non-applicability, however, of procedural due process to rule making is not unqualified, at least since the enactment of the Administrative
Procedure Act. 12 As we have seen, this statute includes in its definition of
"rules" not ony such norms as are generally understood by this term, i.e.,
quasi-laws addressed to a relatively indefinite and unnamed group of
120. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908); ICC v. Louisville &

Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1913); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
431-33 (1935); United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 293 U.S. 454, 463-5 (1935).
See also Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936), 304 U.S. 1 (1937); Jordan
v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1948), Notes, 62 HARV.
L. REV. 506 (1949), 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 121 (1948), and 33 MINN. L. REv. 771
1949); Hackney Bros. Body Co. v. New York Central R.R., 85 F. Supp. 465, 467
E.D.N.C. 1949).
121. Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, supra note 26, at 694; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519 (1944); Bi-Metalic Investment Co. v. State Board of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 294, 318-23 (1933). See also Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White,
296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935); Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52
HARv. L. REV. 259 (1938).
122. Supra note 121. See Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113 Wash. 359, 194
Pac. 595 (1920).
123. REP. ATT'Y CEN. Co.mlr. An. PRoc. 105-11 (1941) is very unenthusiastic on
adversary hearings, but believes in consultation and discussions to precede rule making.
Following this viewpoint, the makers of the APA have made the latter form of procedure

mandatory (subject to important exceptions) and left the prescription of formal hearings
to the enabling statute. SEN. Doe. No. 248, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 12, 17-21, 193-4,
199-202, 225, 248, 251-2, 257-60, 285, 304-5, 315, 353-4, 358-9, 384 (1946).
124. APA §§ 3(a), 4(a). For rules where not even publication is required see
§ 3, first sentence. And see notes 138-54 infra.
125. APA § 4(b), first and second sentences, respectively; Fuchs, supra note 121
at 273-8 (1938); REP. ATT'Y GEN., Supra note 123; ATT'Y GEN. MAN. AD. Paoc. ACT
31-35 (1947), which, however, is of the opinion that statutes "rarely require hearings
prior to the issuance of rules of general applicability." The examples listed, which
include such important laws as the (old) Wage and Hour, Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic, Interstate Commerce, Natural Gas, Packers and Stockyards Acts, and others,
somewhat belie this statement.
126. Supra notes 38-9.
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persons, 127 but includes all norms128 of general or particular applicability
including those that prescribe corporate or financial structures or reorganizations, 29 a definition not fortified by the fact that "orders" (i.e., individual decisions) are defined either as licensing or any final agency
disposition that is not a rule. 2 0 Thus it seems to follow that any agency
action that is final, and not licensing, is a regulationi It is true that Section
2 (c) appears to be restricted to such acts that are of "future effect,"
but this is, indeed, true of any legal command, be it a divorce decree, a
money judgment, a jail sentence, an order to cease and desist from unfair
labor or trade practices or to remove a nuisance, or a food regulation.' 1
It is clear that the constitutional requirement of due process cannot be
avoided by calling a decision a "rule," where it is directed against one or
more named parties and affecting their life, business or property. 3 2 Apart
from this exception, however, which we may call "individual regulation,"
the procedural requirements in the law of rule making are statutory rather
13
than constitutional.
127. Fuchs, supra note 121, at 263-64 (1938); KESsEN, op. cit. Supra note 26, at
134, 255-258 (1945).
128. Section 2(c) uses the term "statements."
129. APA § 2(c). SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 14, 197, 225, 283,
284, 355. The con fusion created by this legislative definition is demonstrated in Foster,
Application of the Administrative Procedure Act to the Statutes Administered by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE

AGENciEs 213, 230-31 (Warren ed. 1947); Miller, Impact

of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act on the Procedures of the Interstate Commerce Commission, id. at 305, 322-23; Reilly, The Labor Board and the Administrative
Procedure Act, id. at 468, 484; Reich, Rule Making Under the Administrative Procedure
Act, id. at 492, 510-12; CARROW, ThE BACKGROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 33-6 (1948);
Schwartz, Administrative Terminology and the Administrative Procedure Act, 48 Mice.
L. REV. 57, 67 (1949); Parker, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in Over-

estimation, 60

YALE

L.J. 581 (1951).

130. AA § 2(d).
131. Fuchs, supra note 121, at 260-64. The "future effect" theory is largely based
upon Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370 (1932), distinguishing between rate making (future effect) and determining of the lawfulness of
rates charged in the past. SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 225, 306, 355
(1946). Yet the true criterion would seem to lie in the individual applicability of the
latter type of decision, which most certainly has future effect, too. Some laws relating
to human rights and the like have purported, in the fashion of the Declaration of
Independence, to "find" rather than establish rights. This of course is a natural-law
fiction.
132. The Supreme Court seems to try to avoid taking a stand on what is, after all,
not solely a matter of proper nomenclature. See, e.g., SEC v. Central-Illinois Securities
Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). But se
Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, supra note 33, at 816, where the court calls it "elementary" that
the actions of the SEC is "adjudicatory in character if it is particular and immediate,
rather than, as in the case of legislative or rule making action, general and future in
effect," without ever referring to the so-called definitions of the APA. No attempt can
be made here to enter into a comprehensive discussion of the constitutional problem
involved.
133. The practical importance of the exception of the "individual regulation" is
diminished by the fact that the pertaining statutes dealing with this type of administrative
act usually prescribe la mode of procedure that lives up to the due process standards
required under the Constitution. See Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, supra note 26,
at 694.
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Unification or at least simplification of the rle-making process is one
of the tasks that the Administrative Procedure Act has not accomplished.
It adopts a few corrections here, a clarification 134 there, but by and large
it follows the rule of ne aliquid innovetur and leaves everything of importance to the enabling statute. Consequently, we have a multiplicity of
procedures rather than a uniform rule. There are regulations that may be
promulgated without legally prescribed procedure; where some formalities
must be observed; where a more elaborate procedure must be followed;
where a regular hearing must be held; and yet others where the procedure is
not incorrectly termed quasi-judicial.
(a) The first-named group, where no procedure whatsoever is required,
as a matter of law except for the necessity that the regulation be issued by
the statutorily designated organ, is small, albeit important. 8 5 It consists
of regulations exempted from both the public-information requirement of
Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act and the procedure of
Section 4. Potentially it could happen that a subject-matter is exempted
from Section 3, yet not from Section 4. Actually, however, this is not
likely to occur. For "rules involving any matter relating solely to the
internal management of any agency" are synonymous with "rules of agency
organization," and free from the operation of Section 4.16 And regulations
requiring secrecy will inevitably constitute a "good cause" that gives the
agency the right to "find" that Section 4 should not be applied. In these
instances, then, rule making is neither regulated by the Administrative
Procedure Act nor are the rules to be published anywhere. 137
(b) Regulations (not expressly exempted as involving governmental
functions that require secrecy in the public interest or as relating solely
to internal agency management) must be published in the Federal Register
as provided in Section 3(a). There are three classes of regulations dealt
with in this subsection: procedural, organizational, and substantive
regulations.
The first two groups include descriptions of the agency's central and
field organization, delegation of "final authority" and the "places at which
and methods whereby the public may secure information or make submittals or requests,"' 1 8 as well as "the general course and method by which
its functions are channeled and determined," including formal and informal
procedure, forms, and information as to "the scope and contents of all
134. Amply outweighed by the confusion created in § 2(c).
135. Where "there is involved (1) any function of the United States requiring
secrecy in the public interest or (2) any matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency." This situation must not be confused with the one arising under
§ 2(a), which excludes certain agencies from the operation of the Act in general, but
not from § 3. For further elaboration sees notes 153-4 infra.
136. SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 18, 258 (1946).
137. An enabling statute, however, may of course provide for some procedure for
the issuance of regulations that are either secret or involve merely agency management.
138. APA § 3(a)(1).
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papers, reports, or examinations."'' 39 The Federal Register of September
140
11, 1946, containing 966 pages, carried all the regulations thus published.
However, as to procedural and organizational rules that had already been
published before September 11, 1946, it was not necessary to republish
them.141
The third group are substantive rules as well as mere interpretations,
i.e., "statements of general policy or interpretations formulated and adopted
by the agency for the guidance of the public .
,,14*
'...
Again we are confronted with the question, What is a rule? If it really were what Section
2 (c) purports to define, it could be held that administrative decisions,
too, must be published in the manner of rules. Fortunately, the Act, not
carrying out its own definition, adds after the above-quoted words the
qualifications, "but not rules addressed to and served upon named persons
43
in accordance with law.'
The last sentence of Section 3 (a) decrees that "No person shall
in any manner be required to resort to organization and procedure not so
published." This means that he may not forfeit procedural rights, appeals,
defenses, or the like, if the agency attempts to rely on an unpublished
procedural rule. 44 For reasons not apparent, the Administrative Procedure
45
Act has nothing analogous in regard to substantive rules.
Section 7 of the Federal Register Act 146 stipulates that no "document required to be published" under Section 5 of the Act "shall be
valid as against any person who has not had actual notice thereof" until
the document or a certified copy is filed with the Federal Register Division
of the National Archives Establishment and a copy made available for
public inspection. This filing constitutes notice of the contents of the
document "to any person subject thereto or affected thereby." Publication
in the Register, in turn, establishes the presumption that the document
was lawfully issued, promulgated and filed with the above-named Division,
139. APA § 3(a)(2). I cannot see any relevant difference between description of
central and field organization and statements of the general course and method by
which functions are channeled. Yet § 3(a) requires that organizational, procedural
rules and substantive rules be published 'separately." This has led to repetitions.
ATr'y GEN. MAN. AD. Pnoc. ACT 18-23 (1947); Delaney, The Federal Administrative
Procedure Act and the Post Office Department in TIE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND TIE ADMINISTRATIvE AGENCIES 199-200 (Warren ed. 1947). The
separation requirement does not apply to rules published before the APA went into effect.
SEN. Doc. No. 248, supra note 136, at 415.
140. 11 FED. REG. Part II (1946). Much of the material therein was later
repealed and amended.
141. ATT'y GEN. MAN. An. Paoc. ACT 18-19 (1947); SEn. Doc. 248, 79th
Cong. 2d Sess. 357 (1946).

142. APA § 3(a)(3).

143. Ibid. And see Toledo, P. & W. R.R. v. Stover, 60 F. Supp. 587 (N.D. 111.
1945).
144. ATT'y GN. MAN. An. PROC. ACT 21 (1947); SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong.
2d Sess. 198, 256, 357 (1946).
145. But see FED. REC. AcT § 7, quoted infra note 146, which, however, applies
equally to procedural, organizational and substantive rules.
146. 49 STAT. 500 (1935), 44 U.S.C. § 301 (1946).
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and that the printed text is a true copy of the filed original. 147 The contents
of the Federal Register are judicially noticed. 148 The term "document"
includes rules and regulations; 14 9 and the inclusion of regulations in the
category of documents "required to be published" was decreed by executive
order of the President and is now embodicd in the Code of Federal
Regulations.'5 0
From the two pertinent statutes' 5

it appears that an unpublished

regulation-unless exempted from publication-is not enforceable against
Publication, then, is a requirement of the
persons not apprised of it.'
rule-making process, unless the rule
(i) involves "any function of the United States requiring secrecy
in the public interest." This statement includes the confidential
operations of any agency such as the Secret Service or the FBI as
well as those aspects of agency procedure whose disclosure would
reduce its utility, as, e. g., confidential rules of the Comptroller of
the Currency to National Banks.' 58 The exception also lies when
there is involved
(ii) "Any matter relating solely to the internal management
of an agency," such as agency budget data, promotional policies,
or internal directives concerning vacation, etc. 5 4 It is to be noted
147. FED. REQ. ACT § 7; Federal Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
148. FED. REG. ACT § 7. Consequently, a confidential circular of the Secretary of
the Treasury, however binding oi his subordinates and hence affecting parties, is not
subject to judicial notice. Kiyoichi Fujikowa v. Sunrise Soda Water Works Co., 158
F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 832 (1947).
149. FED. REC. ACT § 4.
150. The Federal Register Regulations, approved by the President, 3 FED. REQ.
1013 (1938), 1 CODE FED. RECs. 2.2(d), list in small print on 24 pages all the classes of
documents issued by the agencies "hereby" determined ... to be of general applicability and
legal effect." Section 2.3 states that all other documents having "general applicability
and legal effect" issued by any agency, but not designated in § 2.2(d), shall be forwarded
to the Federal Register Division, which files and publishes them if they have general
applicability and legal effect. It would have been simpler if the Act without further
ado had included regulations in the list of documents to be published, but in any event
we may be grateful for the pregnant definition of regulations and documents being of
general applicability and legal effect.
151. FED. REQ. ACT § 7 and APA § 3(a).
152. APA § 3(a) last sentence, differs from FED. REQ. ACT § 7 in that its
language appears to make
nenforceable procedural and organizational rules
even against persons who had actual notice of the rules. This, however, is not the
legislative intent. SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 415 (1946). See APA § 3(a)
and its rather limited value, Caldwell, The Federal Communications Commission in
THE

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE ACT

AND

THE

ADmINISTRATIvE

AGENCIES

90 (Varren ed. 1947); Wanner, Effect of the Administrative Procedure Act Upon the
Civil Aeronautics Board, id. at 117; Dawn, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act
and the Bureau of Internal Revenue, id. at 145; Delaney, The Federal Administrative
Procedure Act and the Post Office Department, id. at 198; Miller, supra note 129, at
318; Reich, supra note 129, at 495.
153. Reich, sup/ra note 129, at 496. Internal, confidential rulings of the late
Foreign Funds Control of the Treasury Department filled several volumes by 1948 when
its functions were transferred to the Department of Justice. Many of these rulings
required in fact no secrecy whatever and were kept confidential solely beeause of the
agency's desire to prevent the public learning when it may expect favorable action on

"blocked" accounts.
154. ATT'Y GEN. MAN. AD. PRoc. ACT 18 (1947); SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong.
2d Sess. 254 (1946).

According to the interpretation of this passage by both the
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that in order to fall under this exception, the rule must be truly
"internal." Where it affects outsiders, it comes under Section 3 (a)
(1) and (2) -description of organization and statement of procedures-and thus under the publication requirement.
(c) Though the rule-making process is "wholly legislative" and it is
"not a condition of its validity that there be adduced evidence of its appropriateness" in respect to every party "to which it will be applicable,"' 155
some regulations do require more than the mere publicity just discussed.
Section 4 (a) and (b), first sentence, of the Administrative Procedure
Act decrees that certain regulations may be promulgated only after the
general public be notified of the intended regulation and be given an
opportunity to take part in a consultative hearing. This is true of any
regulation (1) not exempted from Section 3 as discussed above, (2)
made by an agency falling under the Administrative Procedure Act, and
(3) not exempted under Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
(1) A grammatical interpretation of the first sentence of Section
3 could lead to the belief it is merely overlapping with the exemptions
to Section 4. The Act does not make it clear that regulations exempted
from the requirement of being published in the Register are also exempted
from the quasi-notice and hearing requirements of Section 4. Yet this
is the only possible construction. For if a matter is either, because of its
confidential nature, to be kept secret from or, because of its purely internal
character, not sufficiently important to, the general public, so that not
even the regulation itself need to be made known, then a fortiori the
public has no right to be notified of a merely proposed regulation. Thus
Section 4 need not be followed where Section 3 does not apply.
(2) According to Administrative Procedure Act Section 2 (a) and
subsequent statutes certain agencies are excluded from the operation of
the Act, 158 namely:'
agencies composed of the parties to a dispute or
their representatives;1 5 courts martial and military commissions; military
Attorney General and the Civil Service Commission, this exception includes "not only
intra-agency personnel but also governmental personnel generally." Letter of the United
States Civil Service Commission to this writer, File CL:AK: bh, dated April 10, 1950;
Arr'y GEN. MAN,. AD. PROC. ACT at 18, 27. Civil Service rules would thus be exempted
not only from the procedure of § 4 but also from the publication requirement of § 3,
although the latter speaks only of internal management, whereas § 4 exempts "agency
management or personnel" in general. The Civil Service Commission, however, does in
fact publish its rules, although it does not make them pursuant to § 4.
155. The Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564, 583 (1926).
156. Except for the operation of § 3, as stated above, (b).
157. To this list can be added "Congress, the courts, or the governments of the
possessions, Territories, or the District of Columbia." APA § 2(a), first sentence. These
authorities, however, are not federal administrative agencies.
158. Such as the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the Railroad Retirement
Board, and special fact finding boards. ArTe GEN. MAN. AD. PROC. ACT 10 (1947);
SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 253, 307, 355 (1946). See however, Slocum
v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950), 64 HARv. L. REv. 114 (1950), which
show that the modem rules of administrative law are applicable to such agencies, too.
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or naval authority exercised in the field' 59 in times of war or in occupied
territory; functions expiring at the end or within a fixed period after World
6
II; 60 functions conferred by the Selective Training and Service Acts;' '
War M
2 the Surplus Property Act;'0 3 the Veterans'
6
the Contract Settlement Act;
65
Emergency Housing Act; 64 the Sugar Control Extension Act; the Housing
08 the
0
7
0
and Rent Act; 1 the Second Decontrol Act;1 the Rubber Act;
Export Control Act;'6 9 and of course such others as iay be added by subsequent legislation. 7 0 As far as the various agencies entrusted with the
administration of the above-listed laws arc authorized to make substantive
regulations, the regulations need not be made in accordance with Section 4.
(3) Certain matters are exempted, not from the Act as such, but
expressis verbis from the rule-making procedure of Section 4. The
matters are listed, for no apparent reason, in two different parts, of Section
4, viz., the introductory clause and the second sentence of subsection
func(a). They consist of: military or naval functions;' 7 ' foreign affairs
173 as well
172
personnel
or
management
agency
to
matters relating
tions;
159. Thus not in Hawaii, though there was a military government during
World War II. See Kam Koon Wan v. E.E. Black, Ltd., 75 P. Supp. 553 (D. Hawaii

1948).

160. No doubt this exemption extends to all functions that are limited by phrases
similar to "on the termination of the present hostilities" (as used in § 2(a)), such as
"for the duration of the war" or "upon cessation of hostilities," etc. ATT'Y GEN. MAN.
An. PRoc. ACT 11-12 (1947); SEN. Doc. No. 248 at 82-83, 355.
161. Now 62 STAT. 604 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APP. §§ 451, 1001 (Supp. 1951).
162. 58 STAT. 649 (1944), 41 U.S.C. § 101 (1946).
163. 58 STAT. 765 (1944), 50 U.S.C. APP. 1611 (1946), as amended; now
FEDERAL PROPERTY AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES ACT OF

1949, 63

STAT.

378 (1949),

41 U.S.C. § 201 (Supp. 1951).
164. 60 STAT. 207, 12 U.S.C. § 1738 (1946). This and the following four
exemptions are not listed in APA § 2(a), but rather in subsequent acts.
165. 61 STAT. 35 (1947), 50 U.S.C. AP. § 981 (Supp. 1951).
166. 63 STAT. 18 (1949), 50 U.S.C. APP. §§ 881, 1884 (Supp. 1951).

1951

167. 61

6.

STAT. 342 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APr. §§ 633, 645 (Supp.
(194), 50 U.SC. APP. § 1921 (Supp. 1951).

STAT.

323 (1947), 62

STAT.

101

169. 63 STAT. 7 (1949), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 2021 (Supp. 1951).
170. Such as the DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950, 64 STAT. 798 (1950), 50
.U.S.C. APP. § 59 (Supp. 1951). But see INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950, 64 STAT.
987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 795, 818 (Supp. 1951), declaring APA to be applicable.
171. Not only all the functions of the National Military Establishment but also
such military functions as may be exercised by any other agency, e.g., under the FEDERAL
POWER ACT, 49 STAT. 847 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c) (1946) (concerning electric
power connection with foreign countries during wartime). SEN. Doc. No. 248 at 225;
Ar'Y GEN. MAN. AD. PRoc. ACT 26 (1947).
172. Foreign affairs functions are also listed in § 5, first sentence, as excluded
from the hearing provisions concerning individual decisions. The term is supposed to
mean not "any function extending beyond the borders of the United States but only
those 'affairs' which so affect relations with other governments that. for example,
public rule making provisions would clearly provoke definitely undesirable international
consequences." SEN. Doc. No. 248 at 199, 257, 358. Moreover, the exemption may
perhaps not be limited to "diplomatic functions," which term was used in a prior draft
of the APA bill (id. at 157 and ATT'Y GEN. MAN. at 27), although another passage of
the legislative history would seem to give weight to just this construction. SEN. Doc.
No. 248 at 358. The difference is not quite unimportant. A passport regulation is
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as to agency organization, procedure or practice; 7 4 matters relating to public
property,'" loans, 70 grants, 177 benefits, 178 or contracts;'"D and mere interpretations. 8 0 In addition to these specifically named subjects, any other
matter may be exempted in the agency's discretion, unless the enabling
statute expressly demands notice and hearing.1 8'
If, on the other hand, the Administrative Procedure Act applies and
no exemption lies, the rule-making procedure of Section 4 must precede
the enactment of a regulation. This means that the agency is required (1)
to publish a notice of the proposed rule in the Federal Register and (2) to
afford persons interested an opportunity to present their views; and that
(3) the agency may also for good cause dispense with this procedure.
(1) The notice need be only a "general" one. It is not necessary that
certainly not the exercise of a diplomatic, but probably of a foreign affairs function
Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 171 (1952). The danger of a broad construction of the term
"foreign affairs" is manifest in the dictum in Yiakoumi v. Hall, 83 F. Supp. 469, 472
(D. Va. 1949), where the court held deportation proceedings, concerning alien residents,
to be a foreign affair not subject to § 4 of the APA. The Supreme Court adopted the opposite view by subjecting deportation proceedings to § 5, (WKong Yang Sung v. McGrath),
339 U.S. 33 (1950); Comment, 38 Go. L.J. 659 (1950); Note, 18 GEo. WAsn. L.
REv. 557 (1950); Comment, 48 Minc. L. Rnv. 1127 (1950).
Congress, however,
has obliterated this by exempting deportation procedures from APA § 5, 8 U.S.C. § 155a
(1946).
173. "Agency management or personnel" is considered identical with the second
exemption of § 3, despite its different wording. ATT'Y CEN. MAN. AD. PRoc. ACT 27
(1947). Agency management regulations are thus exempted from the entire Act, since
no other of its provisions appear to be applicable, either. The law could have expressed
this a bit simpler.
174. Thus all the procedural rules are made by the agencies without resort to the
consultative procedure of § 4.
175. The many rules concerning the sale, lease or granting of grazing or mineral
rights in public lands; the management of the TVA properties; ships owned by the
Maritime Commission; or even Indian property, which is held by the United States in
trust or as a guardian, are in this category. ATT'Y GFN,. MAN. AD. PRoc. ACe 27;
SEN. Doc. No. 248 at 257.
According to the views of both the Post Office
Department's Solicitor General and his Assistant, the rules issued by that Department
prescribing the conditions (such as rates and weight limits) upon which mail service is
rendered to the public arc likewise exempted as involving only matters relating to
"public property." Delaney, Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Post Office
Department in THE PEDRAY,

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADmINISTRATIVE

AcENciES 200-203 (Warren ed. 1947), citing authorities in support of the view that the
United States has a "property right" in the postal service, particularly In re Debs, 158
U.S. 564, 583 (1895). The author, however, fails to explain just in what this property
"interest" or "right" is supposed to consist except in a pure fiction.
176. Such as granted by the RFC or guaranteed by the FIIA or the Veterans
Administration, ATT'Y CEq. MAN. AD. PROC. ACT 27 (1947).
177. This excludes rules pertaining to subsidies as well as the very important grantin-aid programs under which the Federal Government aids state and municipal governments for the purpose of carrying out such tasks as unemployment compensation or
road construction. Ibid.
178. This exempts old-age insurance payment or veterans' pension regulations.
Id. at 28.
179. Public contracts increase daily in number and size proportionally with the
increase of statism and armament. Yet all regulations relating to this field are exempt
from § 4, such as, e.g., rules relating to public contracts by the Department of Labor
under the Davis-Bacon and Walsh.lealey Acts, 46 STAT. 1494 (1935). 40 U.S.C. § 276a
(1946); 49 STAT. 2036 (1942), 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1946). See also Perkins v. Lukens
Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
180. See Parker, Administrative Interpretations, 5 MIAMi L.Q. 533 (1951).
181. See notes 201-20 infra.
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the agency announce the complete wording of every detail of the intended
regulation. The "substance" is all the law requires. Hence, terms that
82z
indicate what changes in the existing law are sought to be enacted suffice.
The notice need not be published in the Register if all persons "subject"
to the proposed rule are named and personally served or have otherwise
notice of the proposal. 18 3 It must contain a statement of "time, place, and
nature" of the proceedings to be held.
(2) "After notice required by this section, the agency shall afford
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity to present the same orally in any manner. . . ."14 This language is
the result of many a battle that preceded the enactment of the present
law. " 5 The Act requires no particular period to elapse between publication
of the intention and that of the rile. s6 The law makes it clear now that,
unless the enabling statute specifically so requires, no quasi-judicial hearing
is required: 8 7 no witnesses need be heard by the agency; nor may parties
insist on cross-examining witnesses or experts that were heard; no formal
record of the proceedings need be taken; and, if taken, it need not form
the sole basis for the regulation eventually arrived at by the agency.' 8 The
statute even leaves it to the agency to decide whether the parties may
present their views and data in writing or orally. The general American
predilection for conferences, however, has made the oral, consultative
"hearing" the rule, rather than the expression of opinions by correspondence.
"After consideration of all relevant matter presentcd,"-if any-"the
agency shall incorporate in any rules adopted a concise general statement
of their basis and purpose."'' 89 No reference to whatever material was
presented needs to be made and none is customarily made.
182. Willapoint
Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, suora note 26,
183. APA § 4 (a); ATT'Y GEN. MAN. AD. PRoc. ACT 28 (1947); SEN. Doc. No.
248, at 285 (1946). The phrase is anything but lucid in that it goes beyond the more
usual "affected by" a regulation, If' railroad rates are announced-who is "subject
thereto"? The railroads only? Or rather passengers and shippers, too, in short everybody? Cf. Fuchs, supra note 121, at 263-64,
184. APA § 4(b); ATT'r GtN.MAN. AD.PRoc. ACT 31-32 (1947). This type of socalled informal rule making existing in many agencies long before the APA. REP. ATT'Y
GEN. Commst. AD. PROC. 103-105 (1941).
185. There was a clamor from many quarters that the procedural requirements for
rule making should be stricter or, indeed, that rules should be allowed to be made only
after a full hearing. REP. ATT'Y GEN. COMM. AD.PROC. 103-111 (1941);' SEN. Doc. No.
248, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 20 (1946).
186. ATT'Y GEm. MAN. AD, PRoc. ACT 28-29 (1947) emphasizes that interested
parties should have sufficient time to participate in the rule making process.

But see

Lansden v. Hart, 168 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied 335 U.S. 858 (1948),
where notice of the proposed rule was given six days prior to, and the hearing thereon held
after (!) the publication of the rule.
187. APA § 4(b).
188. See Reich, Rule Making Under the Administrative Procedure Act in THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND TIlE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENcIEs 497, 500
(Warren ed. 1947); Ar-r' GEN. MAN. AD. PROC. ACT supra note 186, at 32.
189. APA § 4(b); ATr'Y GEN. MAN. AD. PRoc. ACT, supra note 186, at 32. The
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(3) Even these minimum requirements are not mandatory. No
notice of proposed rule making, and consequently of an opportunity to
present views and data, is required "in any situation in which the agency
for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement
of the reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."' o While
"contrary to the public interest" could lend itself to an objective determination, this is hardly so where the categories of "unnecessary" or "impracticable" are involved. In other words, the whole procedure need not be
employed where the agency sees fit, for reasons stated, to dispense with it.
Thus the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1949, Section 7(d) (3) (b)
authorizes the Wages and Hours Administrator to issue certain regulations
concerning employees' profit sharing plans; the statute became law on
October 26, 1949, and went into effect on January 25, 1950; only on that
day did the Administrator publish his regulation, stating that the fact that
the Act went into effect the same day made it necessary to promulgate
the regulation with immediate effect, wherefore there was no publication
of proposed rule making since that would have been impracticable!""' The
Administrator failed, however, to explain why it was necessary to wait until
the pre~publication became "impracticable." Be this as it may, there can
be no doubt that the ultimate determination of whether the procedure of
Section Four must be followed is mostly up to the agency's discretion
unless, of course, a statute makes the procedure mandatory. In other words,
we have here a procedural lex imperfecta whose violation will not affect
92
the resulting regulation.
(d) A perusal of Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act
gives the impression as if there were, apart from stated exceptions, but
two types of rule-making procedures: the consultative one of the first
sentence of subsection (b), where it is left to the agency's discretion to
consult with parties interested; and the quasi-judicial one of the
second sentence, which will be discussed below, (e). Other statutes,
however, have developed a category of the middle between the two. An
inspection, not of the Administrative Procedure Act, but of ancillary material reveals that it was not the lawmaker's intention to repeal these statutes
ro tanto. 98
postulate that laws should have a preamble stating its purpose and subject goes back to
PLATO, LAws 723. And see Co. LITT. * 79a; CAIRNS, op. cit. supra note 102, at 51-52.
190. APA § 4(a) (last sentence).

191. 15

FED. REC.

401 (1950).

192. Lansden v.Hart, su/ira note 186.
193. The history of the Act produces, indeed, nothing from which legislative
wll topreerve this type of procedure could be clearly deduced. SE. Doc. No. 248,
79th Cong, 2d Sess. 20, 200, 219, 225, 237, 259, 285, 364 (1946). As a matter of fact,
from some remarks it could be inferred that it was the intention of the law that every
"statutory agency hearing" relating to rule making be governed by the formal procedure
of §§ 7 and 8. SEN. Doc. No. 248 at 206, 364. Yet it is probably true (albeit exaggerated to refer to persuasive legislative history") that "Congress did not intend §§ 7 and 8 to
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The type of procedure here involved exists whenever the law demands
that the agency "hears" the parties, without, however, insisting that the
resulting regulation be based solely on the evidence produced at the hearing.
For instance, the Federal Seed Act provides that the agency must give
notice in the Federal Register of its intention to promulgate a regulation
as well as of a public hearing to be held with reference thereto, and no
rule or regulation may be promulgated until after such hearing."'' 4 Other
examples can be found in the Dangerous Cargoes Act, 19 5 the Tanker
Act, 19 6 the Flexible Tariff Act"9 7 and statutes similarly worded. Now, all
these statutes do require hearings, but they do not require that the ensuing
regulation is "to be made on the record," as the second sentence of subsection (b) of Section 4 demands. Consequently, the rule-making
procedure is regarded as not requiring a quasi-judicial hearing where the
regulation must be supported by substantial evidence, 99 but merely as
prescribing a consultative hearing not categorically different from the
informal procedure that was discussed above (c).
Precisely what importance the mandatory, but not quasi-judicial,
hearing has with regard to the validity of the regulation is not altogether
obvious. The failure to hold a hearing in these cases appears to be not
an unconstitutional procedure, for no hearing whatsoever is required by
the Constitution in the rule-making process. 99 However, the deficiency
obviously may amout to an essential procedural error that subjects the regu20
lation to invalidation upon judicial review.
(e) At times regulations are "required by statute to be made on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing." When this is the case,
the procedure takes place in accordance with Sections 7 and 8, rather than
201
Section 4, of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Such situations here are by no means rare.20 2 They may arise by
apply to rule making where the substantive statute merely required a hearing." ATT'Y CEN.
MAN. AD. Paoc. ACT 34-35 (1947). This statement is supported by the history of earlier
administrative procedure bills. Reich, op. cit. supra note 188, at 501-504. And it
is consonant with the pertinent words of APA § 4(b), "to be made on the record." But
of course the realization that a statute destined to unify the law in fact obscures it,
remains deplorable.

U.S.C. § 1592(c) (1946).
as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 170(9) (Supp. 1951).
196.
as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 391a(3) (Supp. 1951).
197. 46 STAT. 701 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1336(a) (1946); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
198. See Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, supra note 26.
194. 53

195.

STAT. 1273 (1939), 7
REv. STAT. 4472 (1875),
Rav. STAT. 4417a (1875),

199. Id. at 694.
200. This may be deduced from the statutory language, such as quoted above, at

note 194, as well as court opinions, such as the Norwegian Nitrogen case, supra note 197,
that investigate whether the hearing was in conformity with the law.
201. APA § 4(b) (second sentence). And see Reich, Op. Cit. supra note 188, at
492-523; SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 20, 200, 248, 252, 259, 285 (1946);

Ginanne, "Rule Making," "Adjudication" and Exemptions Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 621, 629 (1947).
202. As Reich, supra note 188, at 502, and ArT'Y GEN. MAN. AD. Pioc. ACT 32

(1947) seem to believe.
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express of implied command of the law. 0 3 An example of the former are
certain regulations under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which
must be based "on substantial evidence of record at the hearing," to be
preceded by notice, and the regulation must be based on findings of fact
which, upon court review, are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.20 4 In other instances, such as rate orders issued under the Natural
Gas Act2 5 or minimum wage orders under the Fair Labor Standards Act,206
the statute must be construed to the same effect in view of the fact that
upon judicial review the agency files with the court "a transcript of the
record upon which the order was complained of was entered" and that
the regulation will be upheld only if based upon substantial evidence.
Obviously, a rule in these cases must be made on record after opportunity
207
for hearing.
Moreover, judicial construction has held that regulations issued after
a hearing required by statute and reviewable under what used to be the
Urgent Deficiencis Act of 19132081 on the basis of the evidence adduced at
the hearing, must be regarded as falling into our category, too.200 Examples
are rate regulations for carriers and stockyards under the Interstate Commerce Act and the Packers and Stockyards Act, respectively. Both the
ICC and the Secretary of Agriculture, as well as the courts, have held that
rate regulations-which indeed,constitute administrative acts often bordering on individual decisions-must be based on the record of the hearing. 210
Since Section 2(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act includes in
its definition of "rules" norms of particular applicability, specifically listing
203. The final bill substitutes the word "statute" for "law" as used in prior drafts
of the Act in order to conform to the first sentence of § 5, but not to exclude the possibility of a mere implicit statutory intention to require that a rule be made upon the
record of a hearing. SEN. Doe. No. 248 at 285; Reich, op. cit. supra note 188, at 503,
Cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, supra note 172.
204. 16 STAT. 1055 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (1946); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v.
Ewing, supra note 26; Markel, The Impacts of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
on the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENcIEs 389-413 (Warren ed. 1947).
205. 52 STAT. 821, 831 (1939), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717, 717r (1946).
206. Now 63 STAT. 910 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 201 (Supp. 1951). Under the Act of
1938, the minimum wage orders were of major importance for the entire country until
the legal goal was reached everywhere except in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The
present statute is confined to these islands. FLSA § 8. Cf. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v.
Administrator, supra note 51, for the procedure followed in this type of rule making.
207. Ar'r GEN. MAN. An. Puoc. ACT 33 (1947); Reich, op. cit. supra note 188,
at 502-3.
208. 38 STAr. 220 (1913), now JUDICIAL CODE, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2101, 2284,
2321-25 (Supp. 1951).
209. Arr'y GEN. MAN. AD. PRoC. ACT, supra note 207, at 33-34; Reich, op. cit.
supra note 188, at 503-4.
210. This is so because the reviewing under the former Urgent Deficiencies Act is
done only on the basis of the administrative record. ATT'Y GEN. MAN. AD. PROC. ACT
at 33.4; Reich, op. cit. supra note 188, at 503-4; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495
(1922); United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry, 265 U.S. 274 (1924); Mississippi
Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282 (1934); Acker v. United States, 298
U.S. 426 (1936). See also United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949), 63 HARV. L.
REv. 150-53 (1949).
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"the approval or prescription for the future of ...

corporate or financial

structures or reorganizations thereof . . .," some orders of the SEC and

agencies engaged in similar tasks must also fall within the purview of the
second sentence of Section 4(b). \Vithotut the definition of Section 2 (c),
SEC "orders" would be treated as they were before the Administrative
Procedure Act, namely, as individual administrative decisions which, affecting property rights of parties, could validly be issued only after notice,
hearing, and such other safeguards as the modern interpretation of due
process demands. In short, it cannot be doubted that the making of an
SEC order must approximate a procedure under Administrative Procedure
Act Section 5 ff. in order to be constitutionally valid; 2 1' and this legal
situation could not be changed by calling the order a "rule." Consequently,
agencies like the SEC afford parties against whom "individual rules," as
we may call them, are to be promulgated a procedure that is in accordance
with Sections 7 and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Query:
Must in such a case the principle of separation of functions between the
"prosecutor" and the one who hears be adopted? Sections 4(b) and 5
say in substance that in rule making, even though the rule is to be made
upon the record of quasi-judicial hearing, the separation of functions rule
need not be applied. 212 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has made
it clear that, at least as far as a decision iuvolving a person's liberty is concerned, the Administrative Procedure Act desires no commingling of the
two functions. 2' 3 It might not be unreasonable to extend this principle to
decisions involving property rights though they may call themselves "rules"
under the misdefinition of Section 2(c) of the Administrative Procedure
Act.
In the cases where the statute makes hearing and rule making on the
record mandatory, procedure follows Sections 7 and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The details of this procedure are the same as
21 4
the formal adjudicatory procedure subject to the following exceptions:
(1) Regulations are often based upon voluminous reports, analyses,
statistical data, and similar writings, rather than the testimony of witnesses.
The Administrative Procedure Act allows that the agency may adopt rulemaking procedures that provide for the submission of all or part of the
5
evidence in written form rather than orally. 2
(2) Ordinarily, when an officer and not the agency itself presides at
the hearing but the latter wishes to make the decision, the officer must
211. Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 720, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1949). And see the
Philadelphia case cited supra note 33.
212. See notes 216-20 infra.
213. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, supra note 172, Note, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
557 (1950); Comments, 38 GEO. L.J. 659 (1950), 48 Mien. L. REv. 1127 (1950).
214. See for all three exceptions Willapoint Oysters Inc. v. Ewing, supra note 26.
And see Reich, op. cit. supra note 188, at 506-9.
215. APA § 7(c) (last sentence); Willapoint Oysters Inc. v. Ewing, supra note 26,
at 690-92; Reich, op. cit. supra note 188, at 507.
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first recommend a decision, which is served on the parties and thus subject
to their exceptions. In rule making, however, the agency itself may issue a
tentative decision, though it did not preside; or any of its responsible
officers (rather than the hearing officer) may recommend a decision as if
lie had presided at the hearing; and the agency may also dispense with
this procedure entirely whenever it "finds upon the record that due and
timely execution of its functions imperatively and unavoidably so
217
requires." 2 16 There is not much left of the maxim of the Morgan cases
(involving rate making under the Packers and Stockyards Act) that "The
one who hears must decide," but this has been clear for some time.21 8
(3) Finally, the separation of functions rule under the express language
of the first sentence of Section 5 applies only to adjudications. 219 Thus
the hearing officer, if any, may consult with any member of the agency's
staff on the facts involved in a rule-making case. This follows from its
legislative character, as contrasted with the accusative nature of individual
220
caseS.
Executive orders of the president of the United States are regulations
in that they are norms of general applicability that are not statutes, i.e., not
enacted by !Congress. The procedure in making these orders, however,
seemingly does not fall under the Administrative Procedure Act, although
the latter nowhere so states 2-'
BINDINc EFFECT OF REGULATIONS

Regulations promulgated pursuant to proper procedure and in accordance with statutory authority are often characterized as having the binding
force of law. 222 Of course, a statement like this is a tautology. Any norm
216. APA § 8(a) (last sentence); Willapoint Oysters Inc. v. Ewing, supra note 26,
at 696; Reich, op. cit. sura note 188.
217. United States v. Morgan, 298 U.S. 468 (1936); Morgan v. United States, 304

U.S. 1 (1937).

218. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
219. And § 4(b) refers merely to §§ 7 and 8.
220. Reich, op. cit. supra note 188, at 509; SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong. 2d
Sess. 24 (1946).
221. Nor does the legislative history of the present Act give any clue as to whether
and why the President's quasi-laws are excluded from the APA. Section 5 of the Federal
Register Act, 44 U.S.C. § 305 (Snpp. 1951), expressly lists "Presidential proclamations
and Executive orders" of general applicability among the documents to be published in the
Register, unless the order is effective only against federal agencies or officers. For the procedure followed in this type of rule making see Exec. Orders Nos. 7298, 10,006 (1936),
13 FED. REC. 5927, (1948), 1 CODE FED. REG. 1.91 - 1.97.
222. Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S. 621, 626, 629 (1950).
And see United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291, 302 (U.S. 1842); Gratiot v. United
States, 4 How. 80, 117-18 (U.S. 1846); United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677, 688 (1892);
Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211, 220 (1894); Columbia Broadcasting System v. United
States, 316 U.S. 407, 418 (1942); Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 484-85
(1942); Illinois Steel Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 320 U.S. 508, 511 (1944); Tiller
v. Atlantic Coastline R.R., 323 U.S. 547, 577 (1945); Wilkins v. United States, 96 Fed.
839, 841 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 175 U.S. 727 (1899); Willapoint Oysters Inc. v.
Ewing, supra note 26, at 693; Continental Oil Co. v. Helvering, 100 F.2d 101
(D.C. Cir. 1938); Latgis v. United States, 97 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1938); Lichten v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 691, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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that is valid is binding, and "binding" is the essential attribute of any
norm; consequently, the statement amounts to saying "If a regulation is
valid, it is binding."
Yet the phrase is not without meaning. Invalid norms are not binding,
it is true, but they may yet be validated with the help of auxiliary norms
that provide for res judicata, courts of last resort, and like rules of finality.
Even a "wrong" court decision becomes valid if nobody appeals it, and a
decision of the supreme tribunal that is coitrary to law is yet binding,
and hence valid in this sense, because no appeal is possible?2 3 As to
statutes, the power to declare a law invalid is one which the judge "will
shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with
due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility." ' '
Administrative regulations stand in the middle between statute and
decision as far as scrutiny of their validity is concerned. They are not
binding to the same extent as statutes, but in doubt will be construed so
as to avoid a question of their legality.225 This "doubt," on the other hand,
will be more readily on tie judge's mind than in the case of a congressional
statute.
The Willapoint Oyster case 2--a veritable treatise on administrative
rule making-furnishes a good example for both propositions. The Federal
Security Administrator promulgated a regulation pursuant to the Pure
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act decreeing that oyster cans must contain
at least 59 per cent oysters and that "Pacific" oysters must be so identified.
The court of appeals upheld the standard of fill but set aside the standard
of identity. As to the former, it declared itself powerless to substitute its
own judgment for that of the Administrator. As to the latter, however,
the court held that to force the name "Pacific Oysters" on the West Coast
industrv would be unreasonable (and hence not in accordance with the
law, which authorizes only reasonable standards of identity) as long as
227
other oysters need not be labeled "Atlantic" or "Gulf" oysters respectively.
Summarizing the trend of opinions, 225 we might say that the courts
pay greater deference to the presumption of validity of governmental acts
in cases of regulations than in those of invidual orders, but not as much
as in the case of statutes. This is another way of saying that, while the
making of a regulation must be statutorily authorized, its contents are
largely left to the agency's discretion for which the judgment of the
reviewing court will not be substituted, even though the court might think
223. KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 135-36, 154-55, 157-59, 403.
224. Justice Brandeis dissenting in Ashwander v. TVA, sn/nra note 43, at 345, 34648; 1 COOLEY, op. cit. su/pra note 48, at 332.
225. United States v. Jones, supra note 35, at 664; Morrissey v. Commissioner. 296
U.S. 344 (1936); Roberts v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir. 1949); Willapoint Oysters Inc. v. Ewing, supra note 26, at 696.
226. See note 222 supra.
227. Ibid.
228. Ibid.
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that another regulation could reasonably have been made. 2 0 Nor will the
court, if it finds a regulation invalid, redraft or amend it so as to make
230
it valid.
As a rule, substantive regulations go into effect thirty days after publication in the Federal Register or, if published by personal service, thirty
days after service.2 ' Procedural regulations do not fall under this clause.
It furthermore does not apply: (a) Where the Act does not apply, Section
2(a); (b) Where Section 4 does not apply according to its first sentence;
(c)Where the regulation pursuant to statutory authority grants or recognizes exemptions or relieves restrictions from some statutory requirement; 232
(d) Where the "regulation" amounts to an interpretation or statement
of policy;233 (e) Where the agency holds that the period should be
shortened "upon good cause found and published with the rule. ' 234 The
thirty-day requirement does not prevent a regulation from being retro23 5
active.
The extent to which an agency may set aside its own individual decision
is uncertain,28 6 but there is no uncertainty concerning the agencies' right
to repeal their regulations. The act of repealing is, as in the case of a
statute, a legislative act and must comply with the requirements of lawmaking, particularly with the procedural rule-making procedure described
above.23 7 The revocation of a regulation, like that of a statute, does not
abate liability for damage that accrued while the rle was in force.238
Under common law the repeal of a statute ends the power to prosecute
violations committed while the statute was in force.23 1 However, this is
not so in regard to regulations. A defendant was indicted for selling beef
in violation of a price regulation revoked prior to the indictment. The
Court, per Justice Roberts, held that "revocation of the regulation does not
229. Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co., supra note 82, at 231-33;
Scaife Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 82; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Scarlett, supra
note 82. And see Hackney Bros. Body Co. v. New York Central R.R., 85 F. Supp. 465,
467 (E.D.N.C. 1949). But cf. Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, supra note 26, at 695.
230. Addison v. IHolly Hill Fruit Products, Inc, supra note 70; Flour Mills of America, Inc. v. RFC, 179 F.2d 965, 969-70 (Em. C. A. 1950).
231. APA § 4(c).
232. Ibid.; ATT'Y GEN. MAN. AD. PRoc. ACT 37 (1947).
233. APA § 4(c); ATT'y GErN. MAN. AD. PROC. ACT 36-7 (1947).
234. Ibid.
235. Ibid.; SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 283 (1946); Davis, Administrative Rules-Interpretative, Legislative and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 944-49
1948);.Note, Retroactive Operation of Administrative Regulations,.60 HARv. L. REV. 627
1947
236. Cf. Schopflocher, The Doctrine of Res Judicata in Administrative Law, 1942
Wis. L.REv. 5 and 198; Parker, Administrative ResJudicata, 40 ILL. L. REv. 56 (1945);
GELLIIORN. ADMINISrRATIVE LAw 205-6, 273-83, 762-804 (1947); PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

245-53 (1952).

237. APA § 2(c) (last sentence).
238. Fleming v.Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 119 (1947); Utah
Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 44 (1946); Collins v. Porter, 328 U.S. 46, 49 (1944);
Bowles v. Nichols, 151 F.2d 155 (10th Cir. 1945).
239. United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531 (1944). And see the Utah Junk and
Collins cases, supra note 238.
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repeal the statute, and though the regulation calls the penalties into play,
the statute, not the regulation, creates the offense and imposes punishment
for its violation.1 240 Of course, Justice Roberts was inclined to believe
in the no-delegation theory, according to which the statute and not the
regulation "creates" an offense, whereas others might not have hesitated
to declare that without the regulation there would have been no criminal
offense; hence it was the regulation that "created" the crime, or made it
2 41
indictable, which is the same.
Congress is bound to observe its own laws until changed. Logically,
the same rule applies in regard to agencies and their regulations: In a
recent dictum the Supreme Court, per Justice Jackson, stated that a regulation, promulgated pursuant to the enabling act and hence having the
242
force of law, binds the Secretary as well as others while it is in effect.
May an agency waive-i.e., not enforce-a regulation, particularly a
procedural one? A waiver of procedural requirements is probably permissable where no other party's rights are impaired,24 3 but it seems to go
too far to say "that since the Board has power to make the rules it has
power to suspend them '244 regardless of other parties' rights that may
have accrued under the regulation thus "waived." It might be more
accurate to say that, like any other law, regulations both substantive and
procedural may be waived only if this is not contrary to the purpose of the
law and then only if no party concerned objects. 2 5
Invalid regulations, like statutes, may be subsequently ratified and thus
validated either by an act of Congress or by another valid regulation.2 4 0
Whereas the above-listed characteristics of regulations render them
closely akin to statutes, 24 7 there are other features that show that regulations
240. United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 536 (1944).
241. See Justice Roberts' dissent in Yakus v. United States, supra note 12, at 448.
and Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 529 (1944).
242. Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., suOra note 222, at 629. And see
Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949; Note, 63 HARV. L. REV. 176 (1949);
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Bilokumsky v. Todd, 263 U.S. 149 (1923);
Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1949). But see Spiller v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 253 U.S. 117, 135-137 (1920); NLRB %'.Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 118 F.2d 780, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1941).
243. Board of Tax Appeals v. United States ex tel. Shults Bread Co., 37 F.2d 442
(D.C. Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 731 (1930); see Angelus Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 293, 296 (1945).
244. NLRB v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 241.
245. Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 241; Christoffel v. United
States, supra note 241; Note, 63 HARV. L. REV. 176 (1949). For a good analysis of cogent" law as distinguished from law that may be waived see Lenhoff, Optional Terms
(ins dispositivurn) and Required Terms (ius cogens) in the Law of Contracts,45 Micn. L.
REV. 39 (1946).
246. Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit
Products, Inc., supra note 70; Retroactive Operation of Administrative Regulations, supra
note 235, at 628-34.
247. To which may be added the fact that regulations published in the Federal
Register must be judicially noticed. FED.REc. ACT § 7 (1935), 44 U.S.C. § 307 (1946).
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are administrative acts after all, and thus not unrelated to orders. (1) As
we have seen, regulations must be grounded in law, which to be sure is
the logical equivalent of the requirement that statutes must be grounded
in the Constitution, but which in fact gives the quasi-lawmaker a much
narrower discretion than that of the lawmaker. (2) Statutes need not be
"reasonable," except if one identifies this expression with constitutional
terms such as "due" process, "just" compensation, "equal" protection, etc.
In the world of both regulations and orders, on the other hand, reasonableness is a standard requirement of many an enabling statute that at times is
even read into it where express words to that effect are missing.24 8 In our
system of law and power distribution, these two criteria mean that rules
are more strictly subject to judicial review albeit not so much as orders.
(3) Conflicts between congressional statutes can be more or less easily
resolved, depending on whether or not the maxim lex posterior derogat
priori is followed; regulations, on the other hand, may emanate from
different agencies and yet perchance deal with the same subject matter.
The state of the law on this point is not very clear24' If any general rule
can be drawn here, then it must be in opposition to the lex posterior rule:
the agency that acts first acquires jurisdiction. 250 It is a problem that must
be discussed in connection with administrative jurisdiction. 251

Confidential circulars, however, are not judicially noticed.

Kiyoichi Fuyikawa v. Sunrise

Soda Water Works Co., 158 F.2d 490 (9th Cir, 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 832

(1947).

248. See notes 102-19 sui ra.
249. See United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949); Northwestern Elec. Co. v.
FPC, 321 U.S. 119, 125 (1944) (no conflict found); London Independent School District v. Thomerson, 223 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Keinfeld and Coding,
Res Judicata and Two Co-Ordinate Federal Agencies, 95 U. or PA. L. RFv. 388 (1947);
Note, Judicial Resolution of Administrative Disputes Between Federal Agencies, 62 1-IARV.
L. REv. 1050 (1949).
250. London Independent School District v. Thomerson, supra note 248.
251. For which see PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 125 (1952).

